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Abstract—Control Flow Integrity (CFI) is one of the most
promising technique to defend Code-Reuse Attacks (CRAs).
Traditional CFI Systems and recent Context-Sensitive CFI use coarse
control ﬂow graphs (CFGs) to analyze whether the control ﬂow
hijack occurs, left vast space for attackers at indirect call-sites. Coarse
CFGs make it difﬁcult to decide which target to execute at indirect
control-ﬂow transfers, and weaken the existing CFI systems actually.
It is an unsolved problem to extract CFGs precisely and perfectly
from binaries now. In this paper, we present an algorithm to get a
more precise CFG from binaries. Parameters are analyzed at indirect
call-sites and functions ﬁrstly. By comparing counts of parameters
prepared before call-sites and consumed by functions, targets of
indirect calls are reduced. Then the control ﬂow would be more
constrained at indirect call-sites in runtime. Combined with CCFI,
we implement our policy. Experimental results on some popular
programs show that our approach is efﬁcient. Further analysis show
that it can mitigate COOP and other advanced attacks.
Keywords—Contex-sensitive, CFI, binary analysis, code reuse
attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
CONTROL-FLOW INTEGRITY (CFI) [1] has beendeveloped as one of the most promising techniques
to stop code-reuse attacks (CRAs). Since all control-ﬂow
transfers in a program should act as designed in the original
program, CFI provides a strong guarantee to protect running
tasks. Unfortunately, CFI techniques are suffering from many
difﬁculties when implemented actually accounting for troubles
in static analysis at indirect transfers, especially without source
codes. With the improving of code reuse techniques, even the
existing ﬁne-grained CFI systems could often be bypassed.
With a control ﬂow graph (CFG) extracted from binaries,
call relations are analyzed and every possible target is collected
for those instructions leading to indirect control ﬂow transfers,
such as ret and indirect calls, etc. Most traditional CFI systems
that work at binary-level adopt binary rewrite technique to
insert validation codes into the original programs. However
most of them only focus on the indirect transfers by validating
that whether their targets is contained in the legitimate set
collected by static analysis or not. Without the runtime
control-ﬂow context, the knowledge of execute path generated
by branch instructions can not be attained. Mistakes may occur
when deciding which transfer target is legitimate. For instance,
if the function D is called by functions A, B and C. The return
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target of D will be one of all next instructions of call-sites in
functions A, B and C and it is hard to determine. If we do not
know exactly about the caller, we can not determine where D
should return, which leave many gaps for attackers.
Context-Sensitive CFI (CCFI) [2], proposed recently, takes
all transfers into consider by monitoring the branches of
executable programs in runtime, which mitigates the problem.
PathArmor achieved the goal of CCFI by using Last Branch
Record (LBR) registers, the intel hardware feature, to capture
the branches to analyze the runtime context.
CFI heavily depends on CFG. However, extracting a sound
and accurate CFG at instruction-level from binaries is an
unsolved problem. Therefore CFI systems have to enforce
their policies with coarse CFGs. But coarse CFGs weakens
the CFI systems to defend the advanced attacks. The existing
CFI systems, including state-of-the-art traditional CFI [3]–[9]
and CCFI, are encountering security problems.
Advanced attack techniques, e.g., Counterfeit
Object-Oriented Programming (COOP) [10] and Control-Flow
Bending (CFB) [11], have the ability to make full use of
function existing in program binaries to enforce function-reuse
attacks. The key factor that leads those exploitations effective
is that coarse CFGs lose control of call targets at indirect
call-sites. Once the control ﬂow of a program has been
hijacked, the attacker could jump to any function with
an indirect call. More seriously, COOP has been proved
Turing complete, which means that every Turing-computable
problem can be resolved if exploited with such technique.
Dozens of methods and platforms [12]–[14] have been
proposed to analyze the program binaries to extract their
CFGs. They mainly could be divided into two categories,
dynamic and static. The use of dynamic methods will face
the problem that the resulting CFG may not be complete.
At the same time, it may even suffer from errors because of
lacking runtime conditions of stack and heap. In contrast, static
methods, which will enumerate all possible paths to construct
a complete CFG, will encounter the problem of path explosion.
All methods mentioned above will consume considerable extra
memory and computing resources.
In this paper, we try to mitigate the problem mentioned
above by proposing a static analysis algorithm, which restricts
the targets of the indirect calls in coarse CFG. Then we
implement our CFI policies with PathArmor. We write a
proof-of-concept program to help to analyze the security of
our algorithm. Lastly, a bunch of typical programs are chosen
to evaluate the effect of our algorithms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II covers advanced function reuse methods and some
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state-of-the-art CFI systems. Section III proposes our idea
and algorithm. Section IV describes our implementation of
the algorithm. Section V analyzes our experiment result on
several typical programs and the security of our CCFI policy
which combines our algorithms with PathArmor. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
CRAs techniques have developed for a long time since
the ﬁrst exploitation proposed in 1997 [15], and bring great
challenge to system security. The origin CFI was believed to
have excellent security, but it and its’ following CFI systems
are all facing the problem that precise CFG is difﬁcult to
extract. The existing static analysis techniques on binaries
consumes too much memory and computation resources,
therefore simpler methods are adopted by CFI techniques.
A. Code Reuse Attacks
Code reuse attacks (CRAs) have developed for a long term
since the ﬁrst ret2libc technique published in 1997. Ret2libc
[16] can ﬁnd and take advantage of the function in the
shared libraries and then obtain a shell by calling the system()
function.
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) [17], which can
realize arbitrary computation without code injection over any
sufﬁciently large program codebase, became popular after
2007. In ROP, code in shared libraries and also in program
binaries can be reused. A series of short sections of code,
ending with the low-level instruction ret, named gadgets, can
be chained together into a coherent exploit. ROP is so strong
and ﬂexible that the automated attack methods and tools using
ROP appeared quickly.
Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP) [18] was developed
after ROP. Compared with ROP, JOP can take both gadgets
ending with ret and gadgets which end with indirect jmp.
Moreover, both ROP and JOP have been proved Turing
complete, too.
COOP is a binary-level function reuse technology proposed
recently to exploit C++ programs. Virtual functions and
virtual tables are features of C++ language. At binary-level,
virtual functions are all special function pointers recorded
in virtual tables, which means that program will do indirect
calls when using virtual functions. Based on the analysis of
C++ programs, COOP ﬁnds that there exists many virtual
functions with different effects on memory and registers
(Program Counters, Parameter Registers. etc.). Object with
virtual function table could be counterfeited by COOP to
control where and when the selected virtual functions, which
are called vfgadgets (virtual-function gadgets), should be
loaded and executed.
CFB can achieve an attack vector even when an precise
ﬁne-grained CFI system is deployed. In the code space of
program, what CFB do ﬁrstly is to ﬁnd a path to system()
in CFG. And then the control ﬂow would be diverted down
to this path, and the protection system would be bypassed
successfully after executing system() lastly.
From the ret2libc to the advanced COOP and CFB, the reuse
of existing binary code has become increasingly ﬁne-grained
and more and more carefully craft. The key point is that all
those code reuse techniques using by attackers is based on the
important fact that we do not know exactly how the control
ﬂow changes at indirect transfer points.
B. Control-Flow Integrity
CFI is a natural idea to protect programs against CRAs,
which was believed to achieve excellent security. Although
the origin CFI was put forward as early as 2005, it has
not been widely applied in industry yet. Regardless of
performance factors, the security of existing CFI systems is
still questionable. Recent papers [10], [11], [19]–[22] show
that for both coarse and ﬁne grained CFI systems, there is the
possibility of being bypassed.
Coarse-grained CFI systems [3], [5] do not require precise
CFGs. And they only check that whether the targets of ret
and indirect call are in the legitimate collection according
to result of static analysis, when the control ﬂow transfer is
indirect. For example, in a coarse-grained CFI policy, the legal
destination addresses of all ret instructions are any of the next
instruction after a call, and all entry sites of functions in the
binary are allowable when doing a indirect call instruction,
etc. Such loose policies taken by coarse-grained CFI systems
result in that carefully crafted gadgets can still be found and
used to break the CFI.
Fine-grained CFI [4], [6], [7], [9] systems also suffer from
approximate CFGs, especially in large-scale programs. In
ﬁne-grained CFI, the call relations between functions will be
calculated ﬁrstly and then the functions are assigned with
unique labels. Those labels will be checked before functions
return to make sure that the return is correct. Because of the
coarse CFG used in the CFI systems, attackers may succeed in
mining a path from vulnerability code to a system call. Even a
best formed Fine-grained CFI with the most restrictive policy
can not stop all attacks.
Existing coarse and ﬁne grained CFI systems are both far
from desired effect. One of the most important reasons is that
the context semantics are missing when program is running.
PathArmor which realized a practical context-sensitive CFI
mitigates the problem with the help of hardware (LBR). With
a partly collection of control ﬂow transfers, PathArmor will
validate groups of execution paths, which occur during the
runtime of program. By searching paths in CFG, PathArmor
can judge whether the path is legitimate.
C. Binary Analysis
There are many famous platforms to analyze program
binaries, such as IDAPro [23], BAP [13], angr [24], etc. One
of the main problems to recover CFG completely and precisely
from low-level binaries is indirect branch instructions.
Many programs try to address the problem through static
analysis, in which ﬁled symbolic execution is one of
the popular methods. In symbolic execution, formulas and
symbols need to be constructed based on binary code, and
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paths in CFG can be calculated with some algorithms such as
enumeration of all possible transfers.
A precise CFG may be obtained by symbolic execution,
only if the size of target program is not too big. Otherwise it
would bring out another problem called path explosion. Plenty
of memory and CPU resources would be needed even if a
suitable size program is analyzed using this algorithm.
Since the performance cost is another problem in CFI
systems, it is not a good choice to analyze binaries with static
methods described above.
III. METHODOLOGY
The biggest difference between CCFI and other CFI systems
is the way to validate the running state.
Traditional CFI systems always examine whether the next
transfer target is in the expected legitimate collections at the
indirect transfer points as isolated, ignoring the previous path
the program executed.
CCFI makes it more certain that the path of program’s
executed control ﬂow could be a real path deﬁned in the CFG.
All transfers gathered by hardware will be validated. CCFI is
a more promising way to protect binaries against the advanced
CRAs.
A. Weakness Analysis
CCFI provides stronger defensive ability than the origin
CFI. However, it’s practical implementation, PathArmor, does
not care about the precise of CFG, either. The using of
approximate CFGs weakens CCFI, and leaves gaps for
attackers.
Just like other CFI systems, all possible entry sites of
functions in binaries, with a very simple data-ﬂow analysis,
are taken as legitimate at the indirect call-sites with the policy
of PathArmor. When validating the collected paths, PathArmor
can not decide whether the targets of indirect calls are correct.
So when an ”unknown” path is captured by PathArmor, it will
be inserted into the CFG after that its’ safety is conﬁrmed.
As it is known, transfer targets at the indirect call-sites are
undeﬁned and ambiguity after compiled. In other words, any
address can be called only if allowed by the CFI policy. It
means that each entry address of functions can be called.
Under a weak CFG, all we shall do to exploit binary is to
ﬁnd a path from vulnerability to system functions.
Origin CCFI has talked about the situation under attacking
of COOP and CFB, the forward-edge invariants have been
enhanced to raising the bar against COOP-like and CFB-like
attacks. Actually, PathArmor depends on simple data-ﬂow
analysis to decide the target of transfers at indirect call-sites.
It leads to gaps left for attackers as a result that many targets
are taken and some impossible addresses are selected, either.
B. Parameter Counter Matching Based Indirect-Call
Targets Reduction Algorithm
In most programs written by C/C++ language, there are
many indirect calls as due to that C/C++ allow ﬂexible
function pointers, which make it very hard to analyze the real
Algorithm 1 Forward analysis of functions
Input: Instructions Set of Function F
Output: Counter of parameters consumed by the function,
Counter;
1: procedure FORWARD ANALYSIS(F , CFG)
2: CFG,BBs←F
3: for all block ∈ Set(EntryBlocks) do
4: registerStatus←Set(rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9)
5: toV isit←StackInitialize()
6: visited←StackInitialize()
7: toV isit.push(block)
8: while toV isit.empty() not TRUE do:
9: targteBlock ← toV isit.pop()
10: if targetBlock ∈ visited AND targetBlock
contains loops then
11: Continue
12: end if
13: insts←GetInstructions(targetBlock)
14: registerStatus←UpdateStates(insts)
15: if targetBlock contains Dynamic Site or
targetBlock is EixtBlock then
16: Break
17: end if
18: visited.push(targetBlock)
19: toV isit.push(targetBlock.targets())
20: end while
21: end for
22: Counter ←Get(registerStatus)
23: return Counter
24: end procedure
function to call at binary-level. As described above, the key to
mitigate the problem is to get a more precise CFG to constraint
transfers that occur at the forward-edges, which also means
indirect call-sites. Existing techniques in binary analysis are
always too heavy to use, especially in CFI systems that have
already brought out high performance loss. To address the
problem, we propose a new algorithm basing on the fact that
the using of C/C++ functions follows the Application Binary
Interface (ABI).
The ABI speciﬁes how parameters are passed when calling
a function at binary-level. Six registers, rdx, rcx, rdi, rsi, r8,
r9, are using as parameter registers in x86 64 Linux systems.
Parameters which no more than six are loaded into those six
registers in sequence, and used by the called functions in the
same way.
It is difﬁcult to get semantics at indirect call-sites, but
functions are compiled and used in similar way. When calling
a function, parameters should be loaded and used. So if we
have the knowledge about the counts of parameters prepared
at call-sites and consumed in functions, incorrect transfers
can be limited. According to the thought, the parameter
counter matching based indirect-call targets reduction (PCM)
algorithm are proposed and designed.
C. Implementation
With the knowledge of ABI, we can get the call relations
approximately by parameter analysis between call-sites and
functions. We propose two algorithms to analyze the call-sites,
functions and one algorithm to match them.
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Algorithm 2 Backward analysis at callsites
Input: Instructions of Function Containing Callsites, Function,
Block
Output: States of parameters prepared before the callsites,
registerState
1: procedure BACKWARD ANALYSIS(F , CFG, block)
2: registerStatus←Set(rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9)
3: instSet←GetInstructions(block)
4: for all inst ∈ instSet do
5: readRegisters←GetReadRegisters(inst)
6: UpdateState(registerStatus)
7: writeRegisters←GetWriteRegisters(inst)
8: UpdateState(registerStatus)
9: end for
10: if block is Entry OR Counter equals 6 then
11: return Counter
12: end if
13: Edges← GetIncomingEdges(block)
14: for all edge ∈ Edges do
15: if edge is indirect then
16: Continue
17: end if
18: sourceBlock ←GetSourceBlock(Edge)
19: if sourceBlock contains Loop then
20: if sourceBlock is NOT analyzed then
21: SetLoopBlockAnalyzed(sourceBlock)
22: prevState ←BackwardAnalysis(Function,
CFG, sourceBlock)
23: merge(registerState, prevState)
24: end if
25: end if
26: if sourceBlock is ExitBlock then
27: Continue
28: end if
29: prevState ←BackwardAnalysis(Function,CFG,
sourceBlock)
30: merge(registerState, prevState)
31: end for
32: return registerState
33: end procedure
The six registers are working with four states
including that Read(R), Write(W), Read-Before-Write(RW),
Write-Before-Read(WR). The ﬁrst state of one register after
a function entry can decide that whether it is used to pass a
parameter because the parameters should be read from the
register. Similarly, how the parameters are prepared can be
learn from that the last state, R or W, of the six registers
before a call-site, as the parameter value must be loaded into
the registers. Basing on the idea, we achieves three processes
to realize PCM.
The ﬁrst forward-analysis algorithm is designed to calculate
how many parameters are consumed in a function, and
each instruction which would be executed in the function is
analyzed as what done in algorithm 1. Parameter registers’
states of instructions from the entry to the exit points in each
function are calculated and merged lastly to analyze how many
parameters the function consumed. Detailed as follows.
1. All basic blocks in a function are extracted into a CFG.
2. Parameter registers’ states generated by instructions from
the entry blocks to the exit blocks in the function are analyzed
and collected with a depth-ﬁrst traversal down to its next block
following its’ CFG.
Algorithm 3 Matching between callsites and functions
Input: Functions with counter of parameters consumed,
Functions. Callsites Set with counter of parameters prepared,
Callsites.
Output: Result of matching, result.
1: procedure MATCHING(Functions, Callsites)
2: for all callsite ∈ Callsites do
3: callTargetSet← InitialSet()
4: for all func ∈ Functions do
5: if callsite.paramCount==0 then
6: if func.paramCount==0 then
7: callTargetSet.add(func)
8: end if
9: end if
10: if callsite.paramCount¿=func.paramCount AND
func.paramCount¿0 then
11: callTargetSet.add(func)
12: end if
13: end for
14: end for
15: return Result
16: end procedure
3. Merge all states generated by the instructions.
If state of a register is R or RW, it should be considered as
a parameter used by the function. If a register which locates
on the right side in the order of {rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9}
is used as parameter register but the one left of it is not
used, the maximum number of parameters will be returned.
For example, if a function takes r9 as parameter but null for
r8, rcx or other registers, the counter of parameters should be 6
other than a fewer one, considering that sometimes parameters
are passed to the called function but not used.
A backward-analysis recursion algorithm is implemented
to compute the count of parameters prepared at call-sites, as
shown in algorithm 2.
1. All basic blocks and indirect call-sites in a function are
extracted into a CFG.
2. Parameter registers’ states generated by instructions from
the call-sites back to the entry of functions are analyzed and
collected.
3. All states are merged to analyze the number of parameters
prepared before call-sites.
Basic blocks are analyzed start at call-sites along the reverse
direct of the blocks which are loaded when running. During the
backward analysis, blocks with loops and dynamic transfers
are specially handled for which loops and dynamic targets are
hard to decide.
At last, based on the comparison between call-sites and
functions, a simple match algorithm is implemented shown
in algorithm 3. Due to the approximate result calculated with
algorithm 1 and 2, we have to take a conservative approach to
match the targets of call-sites. If a call-site prepares parameters
is not less than that function could consume, the transfer is
allowed exclude the function consumes 0 parameters. It is legal
only if the count of parameter call-sites prepared and functions
consumed are both 0.
IV. RESULT
In this section, we will evaluate our PCM algorithm.
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At ﬁrst, we use a small toy code to analyze the security of
PathArmor combined with our algorithms.
Then we choose some open-source C/C++ programs with
different size and complexity described as Table I. We
experiment our algorithms on UbuntuKylin14.04 x86 64
system with gcc version 4.8.4.
Programs were compiled in default way with their makeﬁles
and the compile information were saved.
A. Security
In order to make sure that whether the security is enhanced
by our algorithm, we make a demo program written in C,
which the main function is to execute the code from the
address accepted from the console.
Fig. 1 Indirect callsite in our demo program
Fig. 1 shows that two function pointers with different styles
are used in our demo program, and we have two indirect
call-sites in binary. It is worth to noting that two pointers are
assigned to the same value in the short section.
Fig. 2 describes some functions with different parameters
needed and their addresses in binary.
Fig. 2 Functions used in our demo program
At ﬁrst we use the PathArmor to analyze the program and 5
addresses are taken totally including the entry of function foo,
foo1 main and other two function with the preﬁx libc. It is
allowed to be called at any indirect call-sites if the addresses
are taken by PathArmor. But in our demo program, the
function pointer p is deﬁned with no parameter and the other
function pointer deﬁned with one parameter. The function foo1
can be loaded in p as well as p1 and to execute.
In our algorithm, p is unable to execute with the address of
foo1 taken, for which the count of parameters prepared before
p is 0 but the function foo1 needs one parameter passed in.
The indirect targets are constrained by our algorithm.
From our analysis on the binaries of popular programs
shown in Table I, we ﬁnd that function pointers are used
few and cautious. It is hard to get all targets of indirect
callsites precisely, all we can do is to use an approximate result
conservatively. In our policy for CCFI, when calling indirectly,
some occasional false positives are allowed and continuous
error are stopped to guarantee the security.
B. PCM Algorithm
1) Functions Consumed Parameters: With the help of
symbolic table generated when compiling, we analysis the
result of our experiments. At ﬁrst, we evaluate algorithm 1
at all functions for each program. Results are shown in Fig.
3.
Fig. 3 Result on count of parameters functions consumed
In Fig. 3, it is considered as correct if the count of parameter
of functions consumed calculated with algorithm 1 is equal
to or greater than that of functions consumed actually. And
perfect is refer to that parameters count are strictly equal.
Fig. 3 shows that the correct rate our algorithm obtained is
good ranking with the worst which is little less than 80%
(bzip2) to the best which is nearly 100% (nginx), with a
geometric mean of 91.2%.
Some functions in C/C++ programs, like the start main
generated by glibc ending with jumps and without returns, are
often mistaken by our algorithm. In fact in the program bzip2,
a program for compressing and decompressing, the number of
incorrect parameters are less as it is too small.
The perfect rate are different from each other from best
greater than 95% to the worst less than 10%. But in this paper
what we need is to constrained the targets at indirect call-sites,
a precise result is expected but not necessary.
2) Call-Sites Prepared Parameters: In order to evaluate our
algorithm 2, we test it on all direct call-sites for each program.
The direct call-sites and functions are judged matched if the
conditions which described in algorithm 3 are satisﬁed. The
result are shown in Fig. 4.
As shown in Fig. 4, the rate of matched between direct
call-sites and its’ targets are all greater than 80% with a
geometric mean 90.2%. It indicates that our PCM algorithm
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TABLE I
PROGRAMS USED AS TESTCASES
Programs version functions number direct callsites number indirect callsites number size
bzip2 1.0.6 81 468 22 190.6KB
vsftpd 3.0.2 602 2666 8 136.4KB
Lighttpd 1.4.33 314 2239 55 870.5KB
Apache Httpd 2.4.23 1209 5266 180 910.7KB
Nginx 0.8.54 1161 4895 281 2.3MB
redis-server 3.2.1 2557 5574 310 5.3MB
performance good when doing matching between callsites and
its target functions and the same to the situation at indirect
call-sites.
The number of indirect call-sites are far less than that of
direct call-sites, which means it is a great probability that
parameters matching by our algorithm would cover the real
facts.
Fig. 4 Result on parameters matching at direct call-sites
3) Reduction in Indirect Call-Sites’ Targets: Based on the
result taken by PathArmor depending on simple data-ﬂow
analysis, we measure the effect of our algorithm. The result
is shown in Fig. 5.
Comparing to the origin set of indirect call targets used by
PathArmor, our algorithm achieves a good result. The set of
indirect call-sites’ targets is obviously smaller than PathArmor
with a geometric mean 56.8%. And the smaller, the better.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a PCM algorithm, a method to
get a more precise CFG for CFI. PCM algorithm relies on
binary-level static analysis to detect the call relations between
indirect call-sites and functions.
To advanced CRAs like CFB and COOP, due to the
use of function pointers, the reuse of functions in binaries
are becoming popular. The targets of indirect call-sites
can be constrained a lot to stop the function-reuse attacks
combined with PathArmor. Gaps are still exists because of
our conservative policy, but CCFI is further enhanced with
our algorithm.
Fig. 5 Result on constraint analysis: the indirect call targets comparing to
PathArmor
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